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Language, as it has come to be seen, is not only used to communicate ideas 
and feelings: it is also used to do things. This is what is regarded as its 
performative credentials. The performative potential of language is what is 
encapsulated in Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1969) Speech Acts Theory on 
which this paper is premised. This paper examines the speech acts performed 
in Christian wedding solemnizations. Appropriate data for the study has been 
elicited through the audio-visual recording of a Christian wedding. The data 
obtained has been transcribed and analysed. It has been discovered that the 
locutionary acts of Christian wedding vows possess a peculiar linguistic 
structure consisting of declarative and interrogative sentences which are 
characteristically full of those verbs that can be said to be performatives in 
the sense that they are ‘verbs of actions’. The verbs are preceded by the first 
person singular subject ‘I’. The use of these verbs in this manner adds to the 
illocutionary force of the vows. The study also reveals that Christian wedding 
vows are not mere descriptive statements but illocutionary acts (commissives 
and declarations), the explication of which should be necessarily related to 
acts of social performance, deducible from the context of situation. The 
perlocutionary act is deducible from the signing and presentation of 
marriage certificate.   
   
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010 www.afrrevjo.com  52 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Introduction 
Man as a social being communicates and interacts with his society using 
language. Language has been conceived differently by various linguists 
depending on the function, which they subject it to. Interestingly, even 
though a single generally accepted standard definition of language is far-
fetched, the various existing definitions by different linguists are not 
contradictory but distinct and complementary in nature and function. Berry 
Peter (1995:12) observes that “a linguist’s view of what language is, and how 
language works influences the way in which he describes particular 
languages.”  
The conception of language as a “structured and abstract” system underscores 
the formalists approach to the study of language. The proponents of 
formalism (e.g. Chomsky) conceive language as a mental phenomenon 
consisting of abstract linguistic units and the structural relation between 
them. This conception of language undermines the communicative and 
performative potentials of language. Early linguists have conceived language 
as a “highly structured and abstract” system (Bell 1976:19). Margaret Berry 
(1975:13) succinctly captures this view thus:                                 
Language is a structured system. It does not just consist of a 
lot of little atomistic bits which are quite separate from and 
independent of each other. We not only need to know about 
individual sounds and individual words; we also need to 
know all the individual sounds and how the individual 
words are related to each other to form a structured system 
of words. 
On the contrary, the functionalists’ approach to the study of language views it 
as a systematic resource for expressing meaning in social context. This view 
of language as a system of meaning potential implies that its meaning 
transcends the boundary of a defined set of abstract linguistic units and the 
relations within them to include its social context. Thus language as a 
communicative system is concerned with meaning as a function of the 
interaction of code and context of situation so that the significance of what 
people say transcends the signification of the words they use to say it to 
include its meaning in a context of situation. Advancing this argument, Henry 
Widdowson (2004:45) posits that: 
Meaning is a function of the interaction of codes and 
context so that the significance of what people say 
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transcends the signification of the words they use to 
say it. 
This view, however, contrasts with the view of earlier linguists who largely, 
restricted their analyses to function within the linguistic system and some 
contemporary linguists who view functions as the role a category plays 
within a sentence.  
It is also important to note that language possesses a performative potential. 
This is because language is not only used to communicate ideas, feelings and 
opinions, it is also used to do things or perform actions. In underscoring the 
performative potential of language Ruth Kempson (1977:50) avers that: 
“…we use language to do things, that describing is only one of the things we 
do, we also use language to promise, to insult, to agree, to criticize…” 
Similarly, Searle (1979:23) encapsulates this view thus: 
We tell people how things are, we try to get 
them to do things, we commit ourselves to 
doing things, [and] we express our feelings… 
attitudes…bring about changes through our 
utterances.  
 This performative potential of language is what is encapsulated in the speech 
act theory. In this paper, a speech acts analysis of selected Christian wedding 
vows shall be undertaken with a view to describing the illocutionary force of 
wedding vows as well as its perlocutionary effects. 
Theoretical Framework  
Austin’s series of lectures in 1955, compiled in How to Do Things with 
Words (1962) is widely acknowledged as the first presentation of what has 
come to be called Speech Act Theory. According to Ayo Ogunsiji 
(2002:209), “One basic tenet of Austin’s theory of speech-acts is that 
language use does not occur in a vacuum. Sentences and utterances are used 
to perform some acts such as ordering, informing, commanding, condemning, 
accusing, etc.” Austin identifies two types of utterances: performatives and 
constatives. In relation to the former, he provides that “the uttering of the 
sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not only 
be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something” (1962:5). The performatives 
are usually characterized by a particular type of verb- a performative verb – 
that realises a particular action when uttered in a specific context. They may 
be felicitous or infelicitous (happy or unhappy). The criterion for a happy or 
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felicitous performative is that the circumstance, in which it is uttered, should 
be appropriate: certain conditions must obtain. If it is infelicitous, or 
unhappy, something has gone wrong in the connection between the utterance 
and the circumstance in which it is uttered. 
Constatives, on the other hand, are used to state facts or describe states of 
affairs, with a truth-value:  which can be true or false. According to John 
Lyons (1977:727), the distinction between constatives and performatives as 
originally drawn by Austin “rested upon the distinction between saying 
something and doing something by means of language”. 
It is important to observe at this juncture that the dichotomy between so-
called constatives and performatives is no longer sustainable. Austin later 
conceded that there is really no difference between the two because they 
depend on the setting, the persons engaged in a verbal interaction among 
others.  A constative utterance can be used to perform an action, as much as a 
so-called ‘performative’ utterance can. This is why Deborah Schiffrin 
(1994:53) maintains that: 
That the constative-performative distinction cannot be 
maintained because both constatives and performatives 
involve truth and falsity; both are felicitous or infelicitous 
in relation to the conditions in which they occur; both are 
realized through a variety forms that can be rewritten in 
terms of a performative formula. To put this more 
generally, we cannot find either contextual or textual 
conditions that support the constative-performative 
distinction. 
We need to observe here that any sentence form may be used to perform any 
illocutionary act. Even the uttering of “Hello there” to a lone walker in the 
night and with the necessary force may be capable of frightening the hearer. 
Thus, as D. E. Cooper (1973:193) observes, “the perlocutionary effects are 
not… due to the intrinsic nature of sentences” but the effects of the sentence 
in a speech situation. For any communication to succeed, the participants in 
the communicative event must share a body of background knowledge from 
which they must draw if and when it is relevant to the process of 
communication in which they are engaged. John Gumperz (1982:2-3) 
underscores the importance of shared knowledge in conversational 
involvement and submits that: 
A general theory of discourse strategies must therefore 
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begin by specifying the linguistic and socio-cultural 
knowledge that needs to be shared if conversational 
involvement is to be maintained, and then go on to deal 
with what it is about the nature of conversational 
inference that makes for cultural, sub-cultural or 
situational specificity of interpretation. 
 Furthermore, Austin argues that every time we direct language at some 
audience, we perform three simultaneous acts: locutionary act, an 
illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary act. To perform a locutionary act is to 
say something in what Austin (1962:94) calls “the full normal sense”. It 
includes: 
i. The phonic act: uttering noises, phones. 
ii. The phatic act: uttering noises as belonging to a certain vocabulary and 
conforming to a certain grammar, that is, as being part of a certain 
language. The noises seen from this perspective are called phemes. 
iii. The rhetic act: Using these noises with a certain sense and reference. The 
noises seen from this perspective are called rhemes. 
These three simultaneous acts make up the locutionary act. However, each 
time one performs a locutionary act, one is also thereby performing some 
illocutionary act, such as stating, promising, warning etc. If a hearer, through 
his or her knowledge of the conventions of the language, grasps what one is 
doing, there is uptake on his or her part of the illocutionary force of the 
utterance. The effect the illocutionary act has on the hearer is called the 
perlocutionary act, such as persuading, deterring, surprising, or convincing. 
Austin (Lecture 12) suggests that it is possible to distinguish a number of 
broad classes of speech acts, classified according to their illocutionary force. 
He lists the following classes: 
i. Verdictives e.g. verdict, estimate, reckoning or appraisal. 
ii. Exersitives e.g. voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning etc.  
iii. Commissives e.g. promising, vowing, etc. 
iv. Behavitives e.g. apologizing, congratulating, commending, 
condoling, cursing, and challenging. 
v. Expositives e.g. arguments. 
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J. R. Searle (1969:21) later developed Austin’s speech act theory and 
proposed a systematic framework by which to incorporate speech acts into 
linguistic theory. According to this framework the “speech act is the basic 
unit of communication.”  What allows the integration of speech act theory 
into linguistic theory is Searle’s “principle of expressibility” (1969:18-21): 
What can be meant can be said. This principle establishes that it is possible 
(in theory) for speakers to come to be able to say exactly what they mean 
either by increasing their knowledge of the language or by enriching the 
language. Searle is of the view that “there are a series of analytic connections 
between the notion of speech acts, what the speaker means, what the sentence 
(or other linguistic element) uttered means, what the speaker intends, what 
the hearer understands, and what the rules governing the linguistic elements 
are” (1969:21). 
Searle also observes that “speaking a language is engaging in a (highly 
complex) rule-governed form of behaviour” (1969:12). The rules responsible 
for speech acts, however, are rules of a special type that Searle calls 
‘constitutive’. In contrast to regulative rules (that regulate independently 
existing forms of behaviour), constitutive rules “create or define new forms 
of behaviour” (1969:33). 
Like Austin’s, Searle’s rules and conditions for speech acts draw upon both 
context and text: they also elevate intentions and other psychological states or 
conditions enabling a speech act, by assigning them their own types of rule. 
Like Austin, Searle also classified conditions and rules according to their 
necessity for the act. But in contrast to Austin, Searle classified different 
kinds of condition (and rules) according to what aspect of text and context is 
focused upon in the condition or rule; the different conditions also overlap 
(partially) with the different components of the speech act. 
According to Searle, a speaker typically does four things when saying 
something; this is because, as Searle rightly points out not all utterances 
involve referring and predicating (Austin’s ‘rheme’), which was part of the 
locutionary act. So the first of Searle’s four possible elements of uttering only 
contains Austin’s phone and pheme, that is, it only includes two of the 
elements of Austin’s locutionary act. Searle calls this act the utterance act: 
uttering words (morphemes, sentences). The third aspect of the locutionary 
acts constitutes an element of its own in Searle’s scheme, the propositional 
act: referring and predicating. The other two are illocutionary acts and 
perlocutionary acts. 
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Searle’s (1979[1975a]) categories of illocutionary acts are as follow: 
i. Assertives e.g. stating, suggesting, boasting, complaining, claiming, 
reporting. This corresponds with Austin’s Behavitives. 
ii. and sentencing. 
iii. Directives e.g. ordering, commanding, requesting, advising, and 
recommending. This category corresponds with Austin’s 
Exersitives. 
iv. Commissives e.g. promising, vowing, offering. 
v. Expressives e.g. thinking, congratulating, pardoning, blaming, 
condoling, etc. 
Declarations e.g. resigning, dismissing, christening, naming, 
excommunicating, appointing 
The speech act theory is relevant to our study  because it establishes the fact 
that there are a series of analytic connections between the notion of speech 
acts, what the speaker means, what the linguistic element uttered means, 
what the speaker intends, what the hearer understands, and what the rules 
governing the linguistic elements are. 
An Analysis of Christian Wedding Solemnization  
Christian weddings are universally considered by Christians as sacred 
institutions established and ordained by God. As such, a lot of premium is 
given to such an institution. Prior to the solemnization of a Christian 
wedding, the parties involved are oriented and educated on the implications 
of the contract they are about to enter into; the church also scrutinises the 
intending couple by subjecting them to interviews in order to ascertain the 
truism and sincerity of their intentions. In addition, a certified clergy who 
will be saddled with the task of contracting the marriage is also consulted. It 
is important to observe that Christian wedding is not just a physical union, 
but a union of hearts that is ordained by God and beyond human nullification. 
This is in consonance with the biblical injunction “that at the beginning the 
Creator ‘made them male and female’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will 
leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will 
become one flesh’…So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God 
has joined together, let man not separate.” (Mathew 19:4-6) Thus, there is a 
shared understanding among the participants that Christian weddings are 
contracted with the intention that they will last forever. Wedding vows can be 
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classified under Austin’s and Searle’s illocutionary acts called commissives 
and declarations. In this paper, a wedding sample will be analysed in a bid to 
establish the fact that wedding vows are not mere descriptive statements but, 
performative acts. 
In the transcribed data, the exchange of vows began with the use of 
interrogative and declarative sentences. The clergy initiated the discourse by 
using three interrogative sentences. The groom and the bride responded to the 
questions using the following declarative sentences, ‘Yes, I do’ and ‘Yes, I 
will’, respectively: 
CLERGY: Do you take Grace to be your wedded wife to live together 
according to God’s holy law? 
GROOM: Yes, I do 
CLERGY: Will you love her, encourage her, protect her in prosperity and 
adversity? 
GROOM:  Yes, I will 
CLERGY: Will you forsake all other and cleave unto her as long as you all 
shall live? 
GROOM: Yes, I will  
 These interrogative and declarative sentences constitute the locutionary acts 
in the sense that they produce meaningful utterances of a certain grammatical 
order. It is important to assert that the declarative sentences are not mere 
descriptive statements but illocutionary or perfomative acts, that is, they are 
utterances whose saying consists in doing something. The declarative 
sentences above also consist of full verbs that can be said to be performatives 
in the sense that they are ‘verbs of actions’. Such verbs are ‘do’ and ‘will’. 
The use of these verbs in this manner adds to the illocutionary force of the 
wedding vows. The performative verbs are preceded by the first person 
singular subject ‘I’. Not withstanding the fact that the illocutionary or 
pragmatic force of the declarative sentences are encapsulated in their 
semantic structure, the force is to a great extent deducible from the 
knowledge of the context of situation shared by the parties to the agreement. 
It is the awareness of these mutual contextual variables and beliefs that 
makes it possible for all the parties to the marriage contract to deduce that the 
groom is performing the illocutionary act of vowing or promising.  
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The exchange of the marital vows proceeds with another declaration by both 
the groom and the bride thus: 
I ask this people present to witness that before God, I, 
Ahidjo, take you, Grace, to be my wedded wife, to have and 
to hold from this day forward for better for worse, for richer 
for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, 
until we are parted by death                                                                    
It is important to assert here that the declaration above is not descriptive 
statements, but a vow or promise to God and all the witnesses present at the 
wedding made by the couple that they will cleave to each other until ‘they are 
parted by death’. This declaration also presupposes that the couple are aware 
of the fact that Christian weddings, though ordained by God, are not devoid 
of tribulations and adversities, and they are ready to cleave to each other no 
matter the circumstances. It is based on the declaration of the couple in the 
presence of God and the witnesses, as illustrated by the exchange of vows, 
joining of hands, and by the giving and accepting of rings, that the clergy 
pronounces them as husband and a wife: 
I pronounce them husband and wife in the name of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
The pronouncement by the clergy above belongs to a class of illocutionary 
acts classified by Searle as declarations. A declaration is an illocution whose 
“successful performance …brings about the correspondence between the 
propositional content and reality”. In addition, Searle has observed that such 
category of speech acts “are performed, normally speaking, by someone who 
is especially authorised to do so within some institutional framework” (18-
19). 
As institutional rather than personal acts, they can scarcely be said to involve 
politeness. Politeness is not relevant to declarations because they do not have 
an addressee in the sense that applies to personal discourse. The person who 
makes a declaration uses language as an outward sign that some institutional 
(social, religious, legal etc) action is performed. It would thus be totally out 
of place, and would undermine the force of the declaration, if the priest 
solemnizing a wedding were to hedge his words with politeness; changing “I 
pronounce them husband and wife in the name of the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit’ into ‘could I pronounce them husband and wife…” 
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The illocutionary force in the declaration by the clergy transcends the 
signification of the words used by the clergy to include the context of 
situation within which the utterance is made. For example, there is a shared 
knowledge among the parties that the clergy has the authority to solemnize 
the wedding based on the fact he has been authorised to do so within some 
religious institutional framework, considering the fact that he is the reverend 
in charge of the Evangelical Reformed Church of Christ Nasarawa Gwong, 
Jos. Any attempt by any individual who has not been authorised and ordained 
within such religious institutional framework to solemnize the wedding will 
therefore, render the wedding solemnization null and void, and an exercise in 
futility. It is obvious from the discussion thus far, that the illocutionary force 
of an utterance is a product of the “connection between the notion of speech 
acts, what the speaker means, what the speaker intends, what the hearer 
understands, and what the rules governing the linguistic elements are”.(Searle 
21) 
As it would be expected, saying something will often produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the hearer - it 
is such an act of producing some effects on the hearer that Austin calls the 
perloctionary act. The perlocutionary act or effect of the illocutionary acts 
employed in wedding solemnizations lies in the conviction among all the 
parties to the contract that a marriage contract has been sealed and concluded, 
as illustrated by signing and presentation of marriage certificate. The signing 
of the marriage certificate presupposes that the intended perlocutionary effect 
has been achieved. If the parties were to be in doubt as to the success or 
otherwise of the perlocutionary effect intended by the illocutionary acts, it is 
believed that they would not have signed the wedding certificate. 
Conclusion 
Language is indispensable to human existence as every facet of human 
endeavour finds its existence and expression in the use of it. The linguistic 
choices made by the language users from a range of linguistic possibilities 
are, to a large extent, conditioned by the communication needs. This implies 
the existence of certain peculiarities in the use of language by individuals 
who find themselves in different fields of human endeavours. These 
peculiarities are often accentuated and conditioned by the context of 
situation. It is clear from the discussion thus far that Christian wedding vows 
are not mere descriptive statements but illocutionary acts (commissives and 
declarations), the explication of which should be necessarily related to acts of 
social performance, deducible from the context of situation. 
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